Owner Liability for Intentional Torts Committed by Professional Athletes against Spectators by Bluver, Howard C.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 3 Article 5 
7-1-1981 
Owner Liability for Intentional Torts Committed by Professional 
Athletes against Spectators 
Howard C. Bluver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard C. Bluver, Owner Liability for Intentional Torts Committed by Professional Athletes against 
Spectators, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 565 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol30/iss3/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
OWNER LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED
BY PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AGAINST SPECTATORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Violence in professional sports has increased dramatically in
the past several years.' Well-respected commentators have fre-
quently condemned this trend and called for professional leagues
to take steps to reduce it. 2 Not surprisingly, judicial intervention
has been sought as a means to control this problem, s since the
leagues themselves have been unwilling to adopt and enforce effec-
1. The vast majority of this violence has occurred between players on opposing teams,
while a game is in progress, or against referees who make a controversial call. See, e.g.,
Kennedy, Wanted: An End to Mayhem, SPORTS ILLUsTRATED, Nov. 17, 1975, at 20; Yeager,
The Savage State of Sports, PHysicuN AND SPORTS MNEmcINE, May 1977, at 96; Comment,
Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 771.
2. Ranii, Sports Violence Lawsuits Erupt, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 31, col. 4; Reed,
Week of Disgrace on the Ice, SPORTS ILLUsTRATED, Apr. 26, 1976, at 22; Kennedy, Wanted:
An End to Mayhem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 17, 1975, at 20; Surface, Turn Off the May-
hem, READER'S DIGEST, Mar. 1976, at 32.
3. This judicial intervention has been attempted in both the civil and criminal forums.
On the civil side, the majority of cases are settled out of court. A good example of this is the
case of Boucha v Forbes, Circuit Court of the County of Wayne, Mich., No. 76-602398.
Plaintiff, a right wing for the Minnesota North Stars of the National Hockey League, was
skating down the ice during a game with the Boston Bruins. David Forbes, a member of the
Boston team, took a swing at his opponent and hit him in the eye with the butt end of his
hockey stick. When plaintiff fell to the ice, Forbes jumped on top of him and punched him
until they were pulled apart. After eye surgery and an unsuccessful comeback attempt,
Boucha retired from hockey. As a result of this incident, Boucha brought suit and agreed to
settle his claim against Forbes, the Boston team and the National Hockey League on August
26, 1981, for an estimated settlement of between $1 million and $2 million. For a brief his-
tory of such incidents and resulting lawsuits, see generally Ranii, Sports Violence Lawsuits
Erupt, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
On the criminal side, judicial intervention has been much less frequent, since injured
athletes are more interested in recovering damages than in punishing the player responsible
for an injury. Recently however, a new attempt to effectuate criminal liability for violent
acts by professional athletes began at the federal level. Rep. Ronald Mottl, D-Ohio, is spon-
soring a bill that would provide for fines of up to $5,000 and/or a year in prison for profes-
sional athletes who use "excessive physical force that has no reasonable relationship to the
competitive goals of the sport, is unreasonably violent, and could not be reasonably forseen,
or consented to, by the injured person. .. ." Sports Violence Act, H.R. 7903. Representa-
tive Mottl introduced the bill in 1980, and although he concedes that it cannot command a
majority in the House at this moment, he plans to reintroduce the bill until it does com-
mand a majority. See Ranii, Sports Violence Lawsuits Erupt, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 31,
col. 3.
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tive sanctions.4 This Comment will address the narrow issue of
whether the owner of a professional sports team should be held
liable for intentional torts committed by team members against
spectators. Specifically, the inquiry will be whether respondeat su-
perior and negligent hiring and supervision are proper grounds for
holding an owner liable in this situation.
Resolving these issues takes on added importance in light of a
recent incident and resulting lawsuit involving two teams in the
National Hockey League (NHL). On January 30, 1980, the Boston
Bruins and the New York Rangers played a game in Madison
Square Garden. Immediately following the game, several members
of the Boston team entered the stands and allegedly assaulted sev-
eral members of the audience.5 The players claimed that they were
acting in self-defense and in defense of their teammates.6 Never-
theless, as a result of this incident, four spectators filed a $7 mil-
lion lawsuit in the District Court of New York against, among
others, the players involved and the owners of the Boston team.7
The outcome of this lawsuit will significantly affect the manage-
ment decisions of owners of other professional teams. If the owners
of the Boston team are found liable for the actions of their players,
the owners may be compelled to buy additional insurance or in-
crease security at games.
II. BACKGROUND: OWNER LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BY
PLAYERS AGAINST PLAYERS
The Boston Bruin case is the first time a spectator has sought
to hold an owner liable for athlete assaults. Two cases have re-
cently been decided, however, where, for the first time, an owner
was held liable for player assaults against other players. The first
4. See, e.g., Flakne & Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, TRIAL, Jan. 1977,
at 33-40. See also Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425,
432 (1976-77).
5. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1980, § 5, at 8, col. 6, for a description of the incident.
6. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1980, § 5, at 1, col. 6; id. Jan. 31, 1980, § A, at 19, col. 5.
7. Also named in the lawsuit, but not relevant for purposes of this Comment, were the
New York Rangers, Madison Square Garden, Inc., the National Hockey League and the City
of New York. Without ruling on the merits of the case, Judge Robert L. Carter dismissed
the suit against the teams on procedural grounds but gave the plaintiffs 30 days to amend




case, Hackbardt v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,a arose out of an inci-
dent in a game between the Denver Broncos and the Cincinnati
Bengals of the National Football League (NFL). The plaintiff,
Dale Hackbardt, was playing safety for the Broncos and Charles
Clark, one of the co-defendants in the suit, was playing fullback
for the Bengals. During the second quarter of the game, a Bronco
defensive player intercepted a pass by the Bengal quarterback.
The plaintiff attempted to block Clark to make room for his team-
mate to run with the intercepted pass. "Acting out of anger and
frustration, but without a specific intent to injure," Clark hit the
plaintiff in the back of the head with his right forearm.9 This blow
caused the plaintiff to suffer a severe neck injury, ending his ca-
reer."' The plaintiff thus brought an action against Clark and the
Cincinnati Bengals in the United States District Court in Colorado
alleging the blow was reckless misconduct as defined by section 500
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."' The trial court dismissed
the action on the grounds that the plaintiff, as a professional foot-
ball player, assumed the risk of such an injury, 2 and that the judi-
ciary was "not well suited" to determine which civil restraints
should be applied to professional football.13 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed, stating that professional sports are not immune from legal
intervention since "there are no principles of law which allow a
court to rule out certain tortious conduct by reason of general
roughness of the game or difficulty in administering it.' 4 In addi-
tion, the court held that the owner of the team, as well as the ath-
lete, was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.'5
The second case, Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc.,6
arose out of an incident in a basketball game between two National
Basketball Association (NBA) teams, the Houston Rockets and the
8. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
9. Hackbardt v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 353 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd,
601 F.2d 516 (10th Cr. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
10. 435 F. Supp. at 353-54.
11. Id. at 355.
12. Id. at 356.
13. Id. at 358.
14. Hackbardt v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
15. 601 F.2d at 528.
16. No. H-78-243 (S.D. Texas, Aug. 17, 1979). California Sports, Inc. is the corporate




Los Angeles Lakers. Midway through the game, a fight broke out
between the two teams. The plaintiff was struck in the face by
Kermit Washington, a player for the defendant Los Angeles Lak-
ers. As a result, the plaintiff suffered a concussion, nose, jaw and
skull fractures, facial lacerations, loss of blood, and leakage of
spinal fluid from the brain cavity.17 Tomjanovich brought suit
against the Lakers under respondeat superior;18 he further alleged
the Lakers were negligent in hiring and supervising Washington,
since he had a widespread reputation as a violent player.1 9 The
Lakers answered that the blow was inflicted in self-defense and
that violence is an integral, if unfortunate, part of professional bas-
ketball.20 Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for $3.25 million, including $1.5 million in punitive
damages.2
Taken together, the Hackbardt and Tomjanovich cases have
permanently altered the way professional sports team owners can
view their legal responsibilities. The owners have clearly been put
on notice that professional sports will no longer enjoy the judicial
immunity that once was taken for granted.2 2 In addition, it is clear
that respondeat superior and negligent hiring and supervision are
two causes of action an injured athlete can pursue to collect dam-
ages from a team owner. It is less clear however, whether these
theories will be, or indeed should be, used by the courts to hold
owners liable for player assaults against spectators. The balance of
this Comment will attempt to argue that an owner should not be
liable for spectator injuries caused by player assaults.
Il. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Whether the doctrine of respondeat superior should properly
be extended to the situation where a professional athlete intention-
ally injures a spectator requires analysis of two related issues. The
17. See Plaintiffs Original Petition at 6.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. See Bodine, Rudy T. Alters Rules of Game, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 3, 1979, at 13, col. 3.
21. Id.
22. Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 LAw & CoNrEMP. PRoD. 85, 85-86 (1973). John
P. Morris, in his analysis of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), characterized the profes-




first is whether the technical requirements of the doctrine are sat-
isfied in this particular situation. The second is whether the poli-
cies and rationales behind respondeat superior are in fact fur-
thered by extending the doctrine to this situation. Each issue will
be considered separately.
A. Technical Elements of Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior s a master may be
found vicariously liable for a tort committed by his servant, if the
tort was committed within the scope of the servant's employ-
ment.2 Thus, the doctrine is an exception to the general principle
of tort law that liability can be found only upon personal fault. An
injured third-party has the benefit of proceeding against both the
master and the servant.2 5 The applicability of the doctrine to the
situation in issue depends upon whether: (1) There is a master-
servant relationship between the owner of the team and the athlete
who commits the tort; and, (2) the tort was committed within the
scope of the athlete's employment.
1. Master-Servant Relationship. The test used to determine
whether a master-servant relationship exists between an employer
and employee is whether the employer has the right to control the
employee in the physical course of performance1 6 As may be ex-
pected, however, the degree of control necessary has not been
clearly defined,21 and courts have emphasized various factors in de-
termining whether the requisite amount of control exists.
Among the factors most commonly used by the courts are the
agreed extent of control the employer may exercise over the details
of the work,28 the manner of payment,2' and whether the employer
23. For the rationales behind such doctrines, see text accompanying notes 84-93 infra.
24. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
25. For purposes of this Comment, the master-servant concept is used interchangeably
with that of owner-athlete and team-player.
26. See, e.g., RpsTATEmENT (SscoND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958); W. PROssmE HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 460 (3d ed. 1964).
27. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958); see also notes 32-36 infra.
28. See, e.g., Lilly v. County of Cook, 60 IML App. 3d 573, 377 N.E.2d 136 (1978); May
Freight Service, Inc. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Gradler v. Pruden-
tial Property & Casualty Co., 464 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Avis Rent A Car System,
Inc. v. United States, 503 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1974).
29. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Morrison Grain Co., 467 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. La 1978),
aff'd 591 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1979).
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can terminate the employee at will."° Thus, a corporation will be
liable for torts committed by manual workers who are subject to
supervision over the details of their work, are paid on an hourly
basis, and can be terminated at the will of their supervisors.3 1
Factors that have been discussed less often include the length
of employment,3 2 whether the employee offers his services to the
public at large or to one individual at a time,33 the degree of skill
required by the person employed,3 4 and whether the employer sup-
plies the tools and the place of work in the normal course of em-
ployment.35 A court is more likely to characterize the relationship
between an employer and employee as one of master-servant if
these factors indicate a substantial degree of control over the em-
ployee's performance. 8
The relationship between a professional athlete and the owner
of the team on which he plays is relatively simple to examine be-
cause of its contractual nature. In professional hockey, for exam-
ple, the degree of control the team may exercise over the player
can be found in the National Hockey League's Standard Player's
Contract.3 7 The contract provides generally that the player is em-
ployed "under the direction and control of the Club. '3 8 More spe-
cifically, it requires the team to pay salary in semi-monthly install-
ments,3 9 to provide all equipment and transportation necessary for
successful completion of duties,40 and to give each player a per-day
30. Gradler v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 464 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
Lilly v. County of Cook, 60 IlM. App. 3d 573, 377 N.E.2d 136 (1978); May Freight Service,
Inc. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
31. May Freight Service, Inc. v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
32. Id.
33. Bonney Motor Express, Inc. v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Va. 1962).
34. In Giannelli v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the court expressed the view that
highly skilled persons such as doctors must necessarily be independent contractors since
other persons without the necessary knowledge could not exercise control over the details of
the work. 307 Mass. 18, 29 N.E.2d 124 (1940).
35. Gradler v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 464 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
May Freight Service, Inc. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 503; Lilly v. County of Cook, 60 111.
App. 3d 573, 377 N.E.2d 136 (1978).
36. May Freight Service, Inc. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 503, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
37. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND TEAMS 85
(4th ed. 1981).
38. See National Hockey League Standard Player's Contract § 2, reprinted in PRACTIC-
ING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND TEAMS 85 (4th ed. 1981).
39. Id. § 1.
40. Id. § 3, at 86.
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living expense for travel days. 1 In addition, the contract allows the
team to terminate the employment of the athlete under certain cir-
cumstances42 and prohibits the player from engaging in any other
sport without the written consent of the team during the term of
the contract.43
The coaches of a hockey team also exercise significant control
over the manner in which the player performs his duties. They can,
and often do, promulgate dress codes, curfews, and the amount of
playing time an athlete will actually receive.4
These contractual provisions provide a strong basis for arguing
that a master-servant relationship exists between a professional
hockey player and the owner of his team. Because most of the fac-
tors emphasized by the courts4 5 are present in the contract, the
owners can be found to exercise significant control over the
player's performance of his duties. Furthermore, respondeat supe-
rior has already been applied to the sports of football46 and basket-
ball.4v Since the standard player contracts used in these sports are
very similar to the one used in hockey,"8 it seems likely that a
master-servant relationship will be found in hockey as well.
2. Scope of Employment. After a determination is made that a
master-servant relationship exists between an emhployer and em-
ployee, a determination must be made whether the act in issue is
within the scope of employment. Though this term appears simple
on its face, it is incapable of precise definition and has become in-
creasingly difficult to apply in practice.49 While courts have devel-
oped several standards under which they examine scope of employ-
ment disputes, the dispositive factor seems to be whether a given
41. Id.
42. Id. § 17, at 87.
43. Id. § 7, at 86.
44. Id. §4.
45. See notes 30-38 supra.
46. Hackbardt v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601
F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
47. Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D. Texas, Aug. 17, 1979).
48. The Standard Player's Contracts in professional football and basketball are re-
printed in PRACICING LAw INsTrruTE, REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATmxrmS AND TRWms
29, 33 (4th ed. 1981).
49. For example, Prosser has described the scope of employment as "no more than a
bare formula to cover the unordered and unauthorized acts of the servant for which it is
found expedient to charge the master with liability, as well as to exclude other acts for
which it is not." W. PROSSMR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS, supra note 26, at 160.
1981] 571
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court adopts a broad or a narrow standard.
Courts that apply the doctrine broadly adhere to one of three
standards. The first is commonly referred to as a "workmen's com-
pensation" standard. It requires only that an employee be placed
in a position to commit the act in issue as a result of employ-
ment10 A good illustration of this standard occurred when a
drunken Coast Guard Seaman accidently opened three water in-
take valves on a ship, causing it to crash into plaintiff's dock.5 1 In
finding the United States liable under respondeat superior, the
court held that the proper test of scope of employment should re-
semble that used in workmen's compensation cases. Under this
standard an employer "should be held to expect risks, to the public
also, which arise out of and in the course of employment." 52 The
second standard which broadly defines scope of employment
merely requires that the act in issue result from a dispute over
"job-related duties" and occur "within work-related limits of time
and place."53 For example, in one case utilizing such a standard, an
employee of the defendant assaulted the plaintiff because of a dis-
pute concerning the employee's duty to stock the plaintiff's shelves
with merchandise bought from the defendant." The court found
the employer liable under respondeat superior because the source
of attack was related to the duties of the employee and occurred
while the employee was working.5 5 The final broad standard used
in scope of employment disputes is the "state-of-mind" test. 6
Under this standard, an employer will be liable for employee as-
saults against third parties as long as the employee was motivated,
even in small part, by a desire to further the employer's business.
Thus, when an employee's dog bit a third party after the employee
removed the dog from an automobile to display the dog's good
training, the employer-detective agency was found liable under re-
50. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 621, 124 Cal. Rptr.
143, 157 (1975); Coats v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers Local No. 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93
Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971); Carr v. William C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 654, 171 P.2d 5, 7
(1946).
51. Ira S. Bushey & Son, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 169.
53. Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 211 N.W.2d 783 (1973).
54. Id.
55. Id.




spondeat superior. 7 The court found the employee was partly mo-
tivated by a desire to demonstrate the agency's good training
practices.5 8
Alternatively, other courts have developed narrow interpreta-
tions of scope of employment which make it highly unlikely an em-
ployer will be liable under respondeat superior. Two standards
seem to be emerging under this view. The first requires that the
act in issue be "in response to the plaintiff's conduct which is pres-
ently interfering with the employee's ability to perform his duties
successfully."59 This standard has been used to absolve a construc-
tion company from liability when one of its employees intention-
ally injured a government inspector at a job site.60 Recognizing the
modern trend of imposing liability whenever a tort is committed
"because of the employment situation," the court nevertheless held
that the "employment must be something more than the mere oc-
casion for the fracas." ' The second narrow standard has been
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Agency. It requires that
the conduct in issue be of the "same general nature as that author-
ized, or incidental to the conduct authorized."6 2 In addition, the
Restatement provides factors a court should use in deciding
whether a specific act is within the scope of employment.6 8 For ex-
ample, where an employee lights a cigarette near gaseous vapor
while at work and burns a third party, the employer is not liable."
Such an act is personal, solely for the benefit of the employee, and
is not authorized by the employer.
6 5
From the above analysis, it is clear that in deciding whether
57. Id.
58. Id. at 437.
59. See, e.g., Miller v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 364 Mass. 340, 294 N.E.2d 474
(1973).
60. Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 154 N.W.2d 113 (1968).
61. Id. See also Williams v. Community Drive-in Theatre, Inc., 214 Kan. 359, 520 P.2d
1296 (1974); Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash. App. 274, 600 P.2d 679 (1979).
62. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 229(1) (1958).
63. For example, the Restatement lists these factors which tend to show that an act is
within the scope of employment: (1) the act is one commonly performed by employees on
behalf of the employers; (2) the act is committed on employer property during working
hours; (3) the act advanced the interests of the employer to a significant degree; (4) the
instrumentality of the act was furnished by the employer; (5) the employer had reason to
know the employee would do the act in issue; (6) the act involved the commission of a
serious crime. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 229(1) (1958).




an athlete assault against a spectator is within the scope of em-
ployment, the choice of standards is of paramount significance. If a
court adopts one of the broad standards, a player assault against a
spectator will probably be found to be within the scope of employ-
ment. Alternatively, an assault will likely be outside the scope of
employment if a court chooses to adopt a narrow standard.
IV. WHICH STANDARD IS MOST APPROPRIATE FOR DETERMINING
THE LIABILTY OF AN OWNER FOR THE ACTS OF His PLAYERS?
In professional sports contests the line between "hustle" and
"assault" is not easily drawn. Such a line must be drawn, however,
to separate those actions for which a player will be liable from
those for which he will not. It would be an unfair oversimplifica-
tion to find liability for every action merely because it was the "re-
sult of employment." Professional sports require that players be in
physical contact with each other and assume the risk of injury oc-
curring within the rules of the game."'
The same analysis can be applied to owner liability for player
assaults against spectators. To base liability on the owner simply
because the assault was a "result of employment" would impose
liability for acts outside the owner's expectation of what the player
was hired to do. Therefore, owner liability in professional sports is
not a proper forum in which to adopt one of the broad standards
of scope of employment.8 7 Instead, the standard adopted should
allow an inquiry into whether the act in issue was reasonably re-
lated to the job the player was hired to do. In addition, courts
should employ objective factors to determine the issue of liability.
This would prevent a court from freelancing as to the standards or
66. For example, it has been persuasively argued that a personal injury received by a
professional athlete should not be actionable if the act that caused the injury was within the
rules of the sport. In such a case, the injured player will have assumed the risk of such
injury. See generally Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L. REv. 148
(1976).
67. A broad standard of scope of employment may be reasonable in non-sports areas of
the law. For example, in workmen's compensation cases, where insurance is already paid for,
and the injury is accidental, it may be fair to allow an employee to recover even if the
accident did not technically occur while the employee was working. The purpose of this
Comment however, is not to analyze every possible employer-employee relationship and ar-
gue for a scope of employment standard to be used in each one. Rather, it is to argue that
the particular circumstances of an athlete assault against a spectator requires that a stan-




facts it chooses to emphasize 8 and force it, instead, to consider
clear, announced factual considerations.
For this reason, the scope of employment standard adopted by
the Restatement, insofar as it enumerates relatively objective fac-
tors with which to determine the scope of employment, is the best
one to adopt in the sports area. The Restatement provides that "to
be within the scope, the conduct must be of the same general na-
ture as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. '6 9
More importantly, the Restatement enumerates a list of factors
which should be considered by the court.70 By adopting this one
standard, a court would no longer be able to choose an outcome
and justify it by merely adopting an appropriate standard. Instead,
the owners will be put on notice as to the kind of player acts for
which they will be liable. This would allow the owners to take ap-
propriate steps to minimize their risk.7 '
A. Owner Liability Under the Restatement Standard in the Bos-
ton Bruin Case
The team owner of the Boston Bruins would be liable under
the Restatement position if the trier of fact were to find that the
alleged assault was conduct of the same general nature as that au-
thorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. Some of the fac-
tors which the Restatement enumerates support liability in this
case, while others do not. On balance, however, it appears that the
much stronger argument, based on the facts of the case, is to find
that the players' action was outside the scope of their employment
and, thus, exclude the owner from liability. An assault on a specta-
tor cannot be seen as authorized by the owner, since it is contrary
to the owner's interests of maintaining good player-spectator rela-
tions and avoiding adverse publicity, and is unconnected to the
purpose for which the player was employed. The next issue to be
considered is whether adopting a narrow standard of scope of em-
68. A strong argument can be made that the current state of scope of employment law
allows a court to decide an outcome of a particular case, and then simply choose a scope of
employment standard that would justify such an outcome.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(1) (1958).
70. Id. at 12.
71. For example, the owner may be compelled to hire additional security people or buy
more insurance coverage if he knows, to a relatively clear degree, the kinds of injuries he
may be found responsible for.
1981]
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ployment and excluding a team owner from liability for spectator
assaults is a fair and reasonable result. Several factors, both legal
and non-legal in nature, must be explored in order to answer this
issue.
B. Prior Caselaw
The few cases which have examined employer liability for in-
tentional torts committed by employees in the sports area have ex-
cluded the employer from liability. These cases are relatively old,
and it is, therefore, possible to argue that they should not control
disputes in the modern era where sports violence is a much bigger
and well-publicized problem.7 2 The reasoning of these cases, how-
ever, is forceful and convincing, and is equally applicable today.
In Atlanta Baseball Co. v. Lawrence,7 for example, a baseball
player employed by the proprietor of a baseball park entered the
grandstand during a game and assaulted the plaintiff in response
to verbal criticism. In a suit against the proprietor for the assault,
the court held that the assault was not committed within the scope
of employment and that therefore, liability could not be based
upon respondeat superior.7 The court reasoned that the assault
was not related to the athlete's job, but was a personal act pro-
voked by a real or fancied insult.
7 5
There are several cases involving the sport of wrestling which
involve similar analysis. In Ramsey v. Kallio,76 a wrestler jumped
from the ring and assaulted spectators in reaction to various in-
sults. In a suit against the promoter of the match, the assault was
held to be outside the scope of employment. The court reasoned
that the wrestler was not employed to assault spectators or even to
assist in keeping order among them. The assault, therefore, was
not connected to the job the wrestler was hired to accomplish and
the promoter was not liable.77 The same reasoning was applied in
72. See articles in note 1 supra.
73. 38 Ga. 497, 144 S.E. 351 (1928).
74. Id. at 352.
75. Id. at 353.
76. 62 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 1952).
77. Id. at 147. In addition, the court in Ramsey mistakenly pointed out that respondeat
superior was inapplicable because "owners and operators of places of amusement are only
required to guard against such hazards as may reasonably be expected." Id. While the issue
of employer notice is relevant to an inquiry of negligent hiring and supervision, see text
accompanying notes 99-117 infra, it is irrelevant under respondeat superior.
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Wiersma v. City of Long Beach78 where, under similar facts, the
assault was found to have no connection with the purpose of em-
ployment, but was a personal and independent act by the
employee. 9
While these cases can be distinguished on the technical dis-
tinctions between a promoter and an owner, their underlying
rationales support the application of a scope of employment stan-
dard which, like the Restatement, considers the purpose for which
the employee was actually hired. Since in all these cases the em-
ployer was excluded from liability under respondeat superior, such
an outcome in the Boston case seems warranted. The action of the
Boston players in entering the stands was unconnected to the play-
ers' duties, and was a personal act similar to those in Atlanta
Baseball, Ramsey and Wiersma. Hence, it is reasonable to exclude
the Boston owner from liability for any injuries sustained by the
spectators.80
C. Distinguishing Cases Where Owners are Found Liable for As-
saults by Team Members
In the Hackbardt and Tomjanovich cases,"" the assault that
was the subject matter of each suit occurred on the playing field,
during a game, and involved an attack between players. Finding
that these actions were connected with the athlete's employment
and that respondeat superior was applicable, is therefore easier to
understand. Professional sports are very rough and competitive,
with athletes withstanding tremendous pressure to succeed or lose
their chance to earn a livelihood. The management of a team tries
to ensure success by building up the emotional level of its players
to a high degree.82 Given this environment, it is reasonable to char-
78. 41 Cal. App. 2d 8, 106 P.2d 45 (1940).
79. Id. at 46.
80. It is important to remember that an injured spectator can still proceed against the
athlete who actually committed the assault. "If a servant steps aside from his master's busi-
ness, for however short a time, to do an act entirely disconnected from it, and injury results
to another from such independent, voluntary act, the servant may be liable, but the master
is not liable." Savanna Electric Co. v. Hodges, 6 Ga. App. 470, 65 S.E. 322 (1909).
81. See text accompanying notes 8-21 supra.
82. For example, during the course of the trial in the Hackbardt case, two National
Football League coaches testified to the mind set of "controlled rage" they attempt to foster
in their players. John Ralston, the 1973 Denver Broncos coach, testified that the pre-game
psychological preparation should be designed to generate an emotion equivalent to that
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acterize attacks between players as incidental to the players' em-
ployment. Such attacks are likely to occur because players in most
sports must come in contact with one another during their normal
course of employment.
This analysis, however, cannot be reasonably extended to the
case where an athlete attacks a spectator. This act is not related to
the duties of the athlete who is employed with the expectation that
he will not come in physical contact with spectators. There are dis-
tinct boundaries between the playing surface and the stands. To
characterize an assault against a spectator as incidental to the
player's employment is, therefore, unreasonable."-
D. Policy Rationales Behind Respondeat Superior: Are They.
Furthered by Extending the Doctrine to Athlete Assaults Against
Spectators?
The doctrine of respondeat superior developed at early com-
mon law when a servant was considered the property of his master.
Several justifications have traditionally been offered for this devel-
opment. The most accepted was that the master should bear the
responsibility for a servant's conduct since he had absolute "con-
trol" over the servant.8 ' Similarly, since a master has "chosen" the
which would be experienced by a father whose family had been endangered by a driver who
had attempted to force the family car off the edge of a mountain road. Hackbardt v. Cincin-
nati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
83. There are many cases where team owners of professional teams have been held lia-
ble for a wide variety of spectator injuries. However, the vast majority of these cases have
involved negligence rather than intentional torts. The inquiry by the courts has therefore
focused on whether the owners are responsible for "conditions on their premises which
cause harm to spectators, if they . . .reasonably should have known that the condition
exists, that it poses an unreasonable risk of harm, and that the spectator will not discover
the condition and protect himself." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1966). Thus, an
owner will be liable for injuries to a spectator sustained from an errantly hit or thrown ball
when the spectator is willing to pay for screen protection but it is not provided. Hummel v.
Columbus Baseball Club, Inc., 71 Ohio App. 321, 49 N.E.2d 773 (1943); Cates v. Cincinnati
Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 61, 1 S.E.2d 131 (1939). In addition, an owner will be held liable
for injuries suffered by spectators when a bench is unable to withstand the predictable dis-
plays of excitement by spectators, Welsh v. Jefferson County Agri. Soc'y, 121 Neb. 166, 236
N.W. 331 (1931), and when railings are unable to withstand spectators leaning on them.
Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n of Washington County v. Gray, 118 Md. 600, 85 A. 291
(1912). See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.03 (1979).
84. See, e.g., MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 366 (4th ed. 1952); Comment,
The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of
his Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
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servant and will "benefit" from the servant's acts, he should bear
the responsibility for the servant's wrongful conduct.8 5 Though
these justifications were sometimes criticized as unsatisfactory to
explain the wide application of respondeat superior,86 the doctrine
nevertheless became accepted.
Today, while it is recognized that an employer can exercise
control over the job performance of an employee, it is also recog-
nized that an employee must bear some degree of responsibility for
his own conduct.8 7 Thus, respondeat superior can no longer be jus-
tified on the theory that an employer should be responsible for his
employee's every act. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been retained
in modern law on several public policy grounds. The following sec-
tions will describe these policies and argue that they do not justify
applying respondeat superior to athlete assaults against spectators.
1. Deeper Pocket Theory. The most accepted rationale for re-
taining respondeat superior in modern law is simply the employer's
ability to pay. An injured party should be afforded the most effec-
tive relief possible and, though an employer may be personally in-
nocent, the employer has a deeper pocket and can afford the com-
pensation necessary to make the injured party whole.88
This rationale can be questioned in the modern sports era.
While it is true that many professional sports teams are multimil-
lion dollar franchises, it is also true that professional athletes are
among the highest-paid employees in our society. During the past
several years, most have earned between $62,500 and $180,000 per
year.89 They do, therefore, often have the ability to pay a substan-
85. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 84.
86. See, e.g., Comment, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 109, 110 (1916):
That so far... we have a multiplicity of theories none of which has brought
widespread satisfaction. The ... mind of Lord Brougham ascribed the doctrine
to the fact that by employing him I set the whole thing in motion, and what he
does, being done for my benefit, and under my direction, I am responsible for
the consequences of doing it, Duncan v. Finlates (1839) Cl. & F. 894, 910, a
niggardly determinism which, from its concealed fictions, serves only to darken
counsel; and it has the additional demerit of being logically as extensible to the
work of an independent contractor, where vicarious liability does not ordinarily
apply.
87. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 84, at 1304.
88. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 1, at 6.
89. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1979, § 5, at col. 6. The lower figure represents the average
annual salary paid to a member of the National Football League during 1978. The higher
figure represents the average annual salary of a member of the National Basketball Associa-
tion in the same year. In addition, the average annual salary in 1978 of a major league
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tial damage claim. This modern situation is certainly different
than that of the past, where a servant was often judgment-proof
and effective relief to an injured third party could only be obtained
against the employer.
A further distinction between the modern world and the pe-
riod during which respondeat superior developed illustrates a dis-
advantage of applying the deeper pocket theory to team owners.
This is the overcrowded state of the court system and the preva-
lence of spurious lawsuits. By placing liability on the owners of
sports franchises for the acts of their athletes against spectators,
the risk of encouraging spurious lawsuits against "faceless" mil-
lionaires is increased. Even the Tomjanovich decision has been
criticized as "encouraging players to go to court at the slightest
provocation." 90 The possibility of obtaining huge damage awards or
settlements certainly encourages the initiation of such lawsuits.9 1
Thus, placing liability on an owner may encourage similar frivolous
lawsuits. This is especially undesirable considering that today's
athlete often has the financial resources to answer for his own
actions.
2. Entrepreneur Theory. The second rationale often used to
justify respondeat superior in modern law is more of a practical
than legal argument. It is the entrepreneur theory, and its main
premise is that damages arising out of the operation of a business
should be regarded as a cost of doing business.92 The enterprise
would then take out insurance, distribute the cost through higher
prices, and, thus, effectively allocate the risk of loss on any individ-
ual.93 This theory has been criticized since respondeat superior did
not develop as an allocative doctrine, but rather as one based on
responsibility.9 4 Nevertheless, the courts, while ignoring this dis-
crepancy, have continued to apply respondeat superior and justify
it as an effective allocative device. Applying this theory to the
damages a team owner would have to pay if he were found liable
baseball player was $141,000 and of a major league hockey player was $102,500. These
figures have increased during the past several years as well.
90. See Bodine, supra note 20.
91. Id.
92. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38
YALE L.J. 584 (1929).
93. See also Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. Rnv. 716 (1923).
94. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 70, at 460; Douglas, supra note 92.
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for player assaults against spectators is a simple matter. The owner
would take out additional insurance covering this situation and
pass on the cost through higher ticket prices.
Just as in the deeper pocket rationale, however, the state of
modern professional sports no longer justifies this result. Ticket
prices to professional sports contests are already at an extremely
high level, due to the skyrocketing costs of player salaries, travel
expenses and arena upkeep.9 5 Even Pete Rozelle, Commissioner of
the National Football League, worries that ticket prices may be-
come so high that many football fans will lose interest in the
sport.96 To give the owners an additional reason for increasing tick-
et prices loses its appeal considering these circumstances.
3. Deterrence Theory. The third and final rationale for retain-
ing respondeat superior in modern law is similar to the common
law notion that an employer should be responsible for the actions
of his employees. This is the theory of deterrence and its main as-
sumption is that an employer will take greater precautions to deter
wrongful conduct by his employees if he knows he may be liable
for harm that results therefrom.9 7 By applying this theory to ath-
lete assaults against spectators it is hoped the owner would take
effective steps to deter a team member from engaging in such vio-
lence. Such steps might include instituting a system of fines or sus-
pensions for players who assault spectators for any reason, building
gates or fences to separate players and spectators more effectively,
or hiring additional security guards to patrol those areas where
players and spectators are likely to come in contact with one
another.
While such steps may indeed achieve the desired result, there
is an alternative answer that may be far more effective in deterring
a player from engaging in violent conduct against spectators. This
is to hold the player liable for his own violent conduct. The best
means of deterring violence is to make it unprofitable.9 8 If a player
95. See, e.g., Buffalo Evening News, Jan. 31, 1981, § D (Sports Magazine), at 3, col. 3,
where the Buffalo Bills announced an increase in ticket prices for the third straight year.
Effective April 2, 1981, club level seats cost $17, sidelines, comers and end zone seats cost
$13 and lower level end zone seats cost $9. These increases mean prices of Bills' tickets will
have risen anywhere from 26 to 62.5% over the last three years depending on seat location.
Most other professional teams find themselves in a similar position.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 84, at 1303.
98. Id. at 1296-1304.
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is made aware of a genuine threat of responsibility for his own con-
duct, and knows that his team will not answer for him, he is less
likely to engage in such violence. This is a much more direct way of
discouraging player violence than is the process of making the
owner liable and hoping he takes effective steps to prevent players
from engaging in violence.
Based on the preceding analysis of the policy rationales be-
hind respondeat superior, adopting a narrow standard of scope of
employment and excluding team owners from liability for player
assaults against spectators is both fair and reasonable. A spectator
with a legitimate claim is still able to proceed against his attacker
who has the ability to respond in damages. The goal of deterring
this kind of violence is also served, since a player will be responsi-
ble for his own actions and will not be able to fall back on his team
for support.
V. NEGLIGENT HIRING AND SUPERVISION
The theory of negligent hiring and supervision is an alterna-
tive theory to respondeat superior, available to a spectator trying
to hold an owner liable for player assaults. Unlike respondeat su-
perior, which is based on vicarious liability, negligent hiring and
supervision focuses on the employer's own negligence. It requires
proof that an employer breached a duty of reasonable care toward
an injured third party. Courts faced with a claim under this theory
have developed two distinct duties of care which an employer owes
third parties with respect to employees.
The first is that an employer must make a minimal investiga-
tion into the prospective employee's background prior to hiring.99
Failure to conduct such an investigation may result in employer
liability for torts committed by employees against third parties.100
The rationale is that the employer, by conducting an investigation,
may have uncovered the employee's vicious propensity01 and re-
fused to hire him. In Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc.,
102
99. See, e.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
100. See, e.g., Weiss v. Furniture-in-the-Raw, 62 Misc. 2d 283, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1969)
(employer found negligent for failing to make a cursory or routine inquiry into employee's
background); Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 263 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (employer
found negligent for failing to make any inquiry into employee's background).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213, comment d (1958).
102. 69 Ill. App. 3d 920, 387 N.E.2d 1241 (1979).
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for example, the defendant employer was found liable when its
armed security guard injured a third party since the employer neg-
ligently failed to uncover the arrest record of the security guard
prior to hiring.
10 3
Once an individual is hired, the employer has a second duty to
exercise reasonable care in the supervision of his activities.1°4 The
employer is expected to instruct his employees to refrain from ac-
tivities which, though related to the duties and privileges of the
employee, may reasonably result in harm to third parties. For ex-
ample, a landlord can be liable when he permits an employee to
reside in a building and use an open-flame gas heater, if the heater
causes injury to a third person.105
The theory of negligent hiring and supervision has only been
applied to professional sports in the Tomjanovich case. In his
statement of the case, Tomjanovich alleged that Kermit Washing-
ton, the basketball player who assaulted him, "had been involved
in on-court violence several times in the past," and had been a
subject in a nationally publicized magazine article on "enforcers"
in professional basketball.108 Therefore, the plaintiff alleged that
the team which employed Washington was negligent in hiring and
failing to adequately supervise an employee with a reputation for
violence. 10 7 The jury in Tomjanovich agreed with the latter asser-
tion, and awarded 3.25 million dollars to Tomjanovich based upon
the team's negligence in supervising its employees. 08
A. Negligent Hiring and Supervision Applied to Athlete As-
saults Against Spectators
The outcome in the Tomjanovich case illustrates that negli-
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., International Distrib. Corp. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 569 F.2d 136
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Sanchez v. United States, 506 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1974); Parr v. McDade,
161 Ind. App. 106, 314 N.E.2d 768 (1974).
105. Parr v. McDade, 161 Ind. App. 106, 314 N.E.2d 768 (1974).
106. Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1979).
See also Papenek, The Enforcers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 31, 1977, at 43, col. 1.
107. Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1979).
108. Of the $3.25 million, $1.5 million was allocated as punitive damages. See Bodine,
supra note 20. This illustrates the fact that it may be preferable for an injured spectator to
use negligent supervision against a team rather than respondeat superior. Punitive damages




gent hiring and supervision may be an attractive theory of liability
for an injured player. This theory, however, may not be applicable
in an action by an injured spectator. There are several distinctions
between the two situations which persuasively argue that the the-
ory is not appropriate in spectator injury cases.
1. Notice. In practice, the theory of negligent hiring and super-
vision requires proof of two elements. First, a plaintiff must prove
that an employee, based on previous conduct, had a propensity for
violence. 09 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the employer had
notice of this propensity.110 It is the latter requirement which
makes negligent hiring and supervision inappropriate to player as-
saults against spectators. Even if a player has a propensity for vio-
lence against other players, this cannot logically forewarn an owner
of a propensity of violence against spectators. The player has not,
in the vast majority of cases, previously attacked a spectator. Fur-
thermore, unlike an attack against another player, an attack
against a spectator is unrelated to the athlete's performance on the
field and is antithetical to the goal of maintaining good player-
spectator relations.
An examination of the Tomjanovich case supports the above
analysis. Kermit Washington, the player who punched Tomja-
novich, had previously been involved in violence against other
players."" It may be reasonable, therefore, to charge an owner with
the duty to prevent such conduct since he is on notice that it may
occur. When a player attacks a spectator however, the owner is not
on notice as to this behavior. Unless a plaintiff can prove that the
player had previously attacked a spectator, he will not be able to
prove the owner had notice that such conduct may occur.
2. Caselaw. As previously discussed, the cases which consider
owner liability for players' assaults against spectators exclude the
owner from liability." 2 While these cases were decided under the
theory of respondeat superior, two of the cases also considered the
lack of employer notice as to the conduct in issue as an alternative
rationale for excluding the owner from liability. The courts in
these two cases should not have addressed the issue of employer
notice, since notice is not an element of respondeat superior. Nev-
109. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213, comment d (1958).
110. Id.
111. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 72-83 supra.
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ertheless, there is dicta in the cases which support the premise that
player attacks against spectators is not conduct which an owner
should expect. In Ramsey v. Kallio,11 s for example, the court
stated that "owners and operators of places of amusement are only
required to guard against such hazards as may be reasonably ex-
pected. 1 14 Since the employer could not have expected the athlete
to assault a spectator, there is little he could have done to prevent
such conduct.1 5 Similarly, the court in Atlanta Baseball Co. v.
Lawrence 16 reasoned that there was no evidence to indicate a pro-
prietor of a baseball park could have anticipated an assault by a
ballplayer against a spectator.
1 1 7
The reasoning of the above cases supports the argument that
negligent hiring and supervison should not be applied to spectator
injury lawsuits. Though they cannot be used as direct precedent
for lawsuits brought under a negligent hiring and supervision the-
ory, they should have a strong impact on such actions. Absent a
showing that an assaulting player had previously attacked specta-
tors, these cases persuasively argue that it is not reasonable to
charge the owner with the duty to prevent such conduct.
CONCLUSION
The owner of a professional sports team should not be held
liable when a member of the team assaults a spectator. The doc-
trine of respondeat superior is not a proper ground on which to
base liability. Though a master-servant relationship does exist be-
tween an owner and a player, the assault should be considered
outside the scope of employment of the athlete. This conclusion is
supported by caselaw, and by a consideration of the policy ration-
ales behind the doctrine. Furthermore, it would serve the purpose
of deterring violence by making athletes aware that they are re-
sponsible for their own conduct, and would discourage the filing of
spurious lawsuits intended to cash in on the wealth of an owner.
The theory of negligent hiring and supervision is also inapplicable
to spectator injury lawsuits. This theory requires proof that the
employer failed to take steps to prevent reasonably expected harm
113. 62 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 1952).
114. Id. at 147.
115. Id.
116. 38 Ga. 497, 144 S.E. 351 (1928).
117. Id. at 353.
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to third parties. Absent proof that a professional athlete previously
assaulted a spectator, it is not within the reasonable expectation of
a team owner that such conduct will occur. While it is true that
violent confrontations between players of opposing teams occur
frequently, such conduct must be distinguished from player at-
tacks against spectators. Furthermore, making players liable for
any injuries sustained by spectators as a result of athlete assaults
is arguably the best way to deter such incidents.
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